

Black and Latino Politics in New York City Race and Ethnicity in a Changing Urban Context

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Note: This was originally released as an Institute for Puerto Rican Policy discussion paper in December 1985. It was published as a chapter in F. Chris Garcia (ed.) (1988), Latinos and the Political System (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press), pp. 171-194; and reprinted as "Black and Latino Politics in New York: Race and Ethnicity in a Changing Urban Context" in the journal New Community (London), Vol. XIV, No. 3 (Spring 1988), pp. 370-384,

WITH RACIAL-ETHNIC MINORITIES expected to increase from 48 percent of New York City's population in 1980 to close to 60 percent in 1990, the political consequences of this development are, surprisingly, not well understood. An important reason for this is that the dramatic growth and increasing diversity of the city's population is a subject that is not being adequately addressed by researchers or policymakers. While, on the one hand, there is a tendency to ignore or oversimplify the role of minorities in the city's political process, there appears to be, on the other, problems in how minority politics are conceptualized in such rapidly changing circumstances.¹

This study will begin by arguing that black and Latino politics in New York City can be expected to enter a potentially new phase of development in the late 1980s. This will be the result of demographic changes occurring not only in New York, but in most of the country's larger cities. However, it will also be argued here that developments in the last two decades in New York have put strains on how minority politics has been defined and that these developments call for a basic reassessment of prevailing theories and concepts in this area. In order to illustrate this, the second part of this analysis will concentrate on the problem of the increasingly limited meaning of the term "minority" in contemporary New York City politics. This will be done by presenting a comparative analysis of the black and Latino political experiences in the city. Some conclusions will be presented on the implications of this both for research and minority political strategies in New York and other urban centers

FROM MINORITY TO MAJORITY: THE NEW CONTEXT OF MINORITY POLITICS IN NEW YORK CITY

As New York City moves from being majority white to majority nonwhite in the 1980s, it is confronted with some old issues in new ways. Being no different than many other cities that are going or have gone through this experience, its position as an international corporate and finance center makes its response to this growing minority presence of very broad interest.

Despite a two-decade old decline in total population, New York remains the country's largest city and with this comes the continuing distinctiveness of its size. To point out that more than half of its population is nonwhite is, therefore, a significant development since the more than 3.5 million blacks, Latinos and other minorities this represents are greater, for example, than the total population of the second largest city in the United States in 1985, Los Angeles, as well as equal to or greater in population than close to one-fourth of all the nations in the world.² The political potential of such huge numbers of people in one city is enormous, and impossible, one would imagine, to ignore politically.

In 1980 New York City's population, according to the Census, was 52 percent white, 24 percent black, 20 percent Latino and 4 percent Asian and other minority. By 1990, it is estimated that with a total population projected to be 2 percent smaller, this will change to 41 percent white, 28 percent black, 24 percent Latino, and 7 percent Asian and other minority (or 59 percent nonwhite).³ (See table 1 below) These changes will be the result of the continuing decline of the city's white population (expected to decrease by 22 percent in the 1980s) and increases in all its nonwhite population groups (+14 percent for blacks, +17 percent for Latinos, and +69 percent for Asians and other minorities).⁴

TABLE 1
New York City Population by Race and Ethnicity
1970, 1980 and 1990 (Projected)

GROUP	POPULATION (000s)							
	1970		1980		1990		Percent Change	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	1970-80	1980-90
Whites	4,997	63.3%	3,668	51.9%	2,871	41.3%	-27	-22
Blacks	1,514	19.2%	1,695	24.0%	1,929	27.7%	+12	+14
Latinos	1,201	15.2%	1,406	19.9%	1,646	23.7%	+17	+17
Other Minority	185	2.3%	303	4.3%	511	7.3%	+64	+69
Total	7,837	100.0%	7,072	100.0%	6,957	100.0%	-10	-2

Source: Adapted from: Emanuel Tobier, *The Changing Pace of Poverty* (New York: Community Service Society, 1984), p. 104; and US. Bureau of Census, 1980 Census of Population, vol. 1. Characteristics of Population, Chap. B. General Population Characteristics. Part 34. New York. PC80-1-B34 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), Table 31, pp. 195-196.

The significance of this transformation of New York into a "majority minority" city in the late 1980s takes on an even greater significance when compared to similar developments nationally. (See table 2 below) In 1980 only two of the country's ten largest cities, Detroit and Baltimore, were majority nonwhite (overwhelmingly black). By 1990, given current population trends, it can be reasonably projected that perhaps as many as eight of these ten cities will be predominantly black and Latino.

TABLE 2
Black and Latino Composition of
Ten Largest US. Cities, 1980

CITY	POPULATION		
	(000s)	% BLACK	% LATINO ^a
New York, NY	7,072	25.2	19.9
Chicago, IL	3,005	39.8	14.0
Los Angeles, CA	2,967	17.0	27.5
Philadelphia, PA	1,688	37.8	3.8
Houston, TX	1,595	27.6	17.6
Detroit, MI	1,203	63.1	2.4
Dallas, TX	904	29.4	12.3
San Diego, CA	876	89.0	14.9
Phoenix, AZ	790	4.8	14.8
Baltimore, MD	787	54.8	1.0

a. Latinos may be of any race and are included in the black category.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1984 Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), Table 29, pp. 28-30.

Consequently, New York will be facing this minority political challenge within a national context it shares. The development of black and Latino politics in New York will, no doubt, be buttressed by these broader trends, which have the potential to push it to a new level of activity and importance to the city as a whole, as well as nationally.

These major changes in the racial-ethnic makeup of New York come at a time when local and national political responsiveness to minority and urban concerns has not only been low, but antagonistic as well. Since the late 1970s, but particularly under the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, government efforts to help minorities and the poor, such as social welfare programs, affirmative action, and civil rights enforcement, have come under attack.⁵ The dramatic growth of immigration from Third World countries, mainly Latin America and Asia, has, in part, helped fuel a “new patriotism” in the United States that has led to punitive immigration reform proposals, attacks on bilingualism that have taken the form nationally of a movement to formally make English the official language of the United States, and a general increase in scapegoating and violence against nonwhites.

In New York City, blacks and Latinos, who make up 90 percent of its minority population, share a common subordinate position in the city’s social and political systems, perhaps more so than in other parts of the country. For example, in 1982 the poverty rate for the city as a whole was estimated to have been about 24 percent, while for blacks it was 35 percent and for Latinos, 45 percent.⁶ As a consequence of these high poverty rates, although blacks and Latinos combined were about 44 percent of New York City’s population in 1980, each represented 36 percent (and, thus together, close to three-quarters) of the city’s population living below the federal poverty level that

year. Projected poverty rates and changes in the population would indicate that blacks and Latinos comprise an even larger portion of the city's poor people today.

In addition, blacks and Latinos not only live in the poorest and most deteriorated sections in the city, but unlike many other cities where they live in virtually isolated neighborhoods of their own, there is much greater black-Latino residential proximity and interaction in New York. This is particularly the case between blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans, while other Latino groups in the city exhibit lower rates of segregation from nonminority whites.⁷ Coupled with the African roots of the Spanishspeaking (as well as English and French Creole) Caribbean, from where most new black and Latino groups in New York originate, this situation helps reinforce the continuities between the experiences of the two groups in the city.⁸

The social problems faced by both blacks and Latinos in New York are strikingly similar. These include very high unemployment rates, segmentation in the weakest sectors of the city's economy, extremely high dropout rates from the schools, and intense residential displacement due to factors such as disinvestment and gentrification.⁹ Along with these problems is the persistent one of the lack of representation of blacks and Latinos in the city's major decision-making centers as well as significant underrepresentation in its secondary political institutions, primarily in the ward-based legislative bodies on the local and state levels.

THE POLITICAL RELEVANCE OF THE TERM "MINORITY" IN THE 1980s

Despite the common circumstances that blacks and Latinos in New York City find themselves in, differences between them are important to understand. The overgeneralized use of the term "minority" has more often than not served to confuse rather than aid analyses of black and Latino politics. Many Latinos complain that blacks use the term to increase their political leverage while excluding Latinos from the benefits that ensue from this strategy. There are blacks who view the use of the term as a way of diluting their claims on American society by allowing other groups to piggyback on the black struggle.¹⁰ On another level, evaluating demographic changes in New York City from 1974-1983, Salins has gone as far as to propose that the "entire minority/non-minority typology should probably be scraped in a city where we have such a large scale continuing immigration of citizens from every corner of the globe."¹¹

One of the major difficulties that the use of the term "minority" creates is the tendency to uncritically collapse the experiences of black and Latinos into one global category that could be meaningless or misleading in certain contexts. The problems with this are many, as an analysis of black-Latino differences in a number of areas will illustrate. Those to be examined here include black and Latino views on race and minority status, their differences in approaching issues such as bilingualism and immigration, the differential access to government between them, and their respective patterns and levels of electoral participation.

Race and Minority Status

A variety of factors contribute to the significantly different ways in which blacks and Latinos view the race question. American blacks have emerged from an experience of slavery in the United States in which race has historically been viewed as a genetic attribute, a context which served to define their people racially.¹² Latinos, on the other hand, have a wider variation in skin color, a legacy of a Spanish colonial past which in the Caribbean, from which most of those in New York came, entailed greater interracial mixing of Spanish, other European, African, and indigenous Indian peoples. As a result, there is more of a tendency for Latinos to view race from a physiological perspective. In this sense Latinos entered a society which perceives race differently than they have historically, leading to a greater ambiguity on this question by Latinos than by American blacks today.¹³

The potential divisiveness of this issue between blacks and Latinos should not be underestimated. While there are large numbers of Latinos that reject the bi-polar racial assumptions of the United States and prefer to identify more along national-origin lines (that is, as Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Colombians, etc.), there is the longstanding suspicion by American blacks that Puerto Ricans and other Latinos really consider themselves to be white.¹⁴ Interestingly enough, within the black community itself this issue has been a recurrent one in terms of its West Indian components, many of whom also appear to identify primarily along national-origin rather than racial lines.¹⁵

These differences in self-identification have also carried over into how blacks and Latinos perceive their minority status in the United States. While American blacks have developed a distinctive heritage after close to four hundred years in the United States, Latinos in New York come from culturally and/or politically foreign countries. Compared to the black rootedness in the U.S. experience, albeit in a subordinate relationship, Latinos, particularly in the Northeast, have a more tenuous relationship.

There are many Latinos who, as a consequence, do not quite see themselves as a minority group in the United States in the way American blacks do. There is among Latinos a widespread belief that they are temporary immigrants with the ultimate aim of returning to their countries of origin. This belief is reinforced by three factors: (1) the high degree of circular migration to and from their countries of origin¹⁶; (2) the strong influence and visibility of home country politics, issues, and traditions in their U.S. communities¹⁷; and (3) the significantly lower naturalization rates of Latino groups that predominate in New York City compared to most other immigrant groups.¹⁸

Politically, of course, this creates a certain ambivalence toward life in the U.S. and its political institutions.¹⁹ However, at the same time, groups like Puerto Ricans, who have a larger portion of its members with a longer history in New York than other Latinos and that, as a result, are more multigenerational, have on the whole developed views closer to American blacks on their minority status in the United States.²⁰ There is evidence as well that other Latino groups, particularly Dominicans, are moving in the Puerto Rican direction and becoming more involved in New York politics.²¹ For example, on the Upper West Side of Manhattan, which is largely Dominican, a Dominican was elected

Democratic Party district leader and one also unsuccessfully ran for City Council against a white incumbent, signaling a growing involvement in electoral politics.

The issue inevitably arises whether the European immigrant model of political and social adaptation is an appropriate one for Latinos, if not blacks. While in the black case the relevance of this model has been effectively refuted, its applicability in terms of Latinos has been more persistently invoked²² “A common political analogy,” Barnett explains, “likens blacks to white ethnic groups and is followed by arguments that even if blacks are not precisely like white ethnic groups, their usages of group power can produce similar results. This model,” she finds, “is troublesome because it distorts white ethnic group history (most significantly the way they really used politics) and the sociology of both the black experience and the white ethnic experience.”²³ Browning, Marshall, and Tabb observe, “Though there are undeniable parallels between blacks and Hispanics and the earlier immigrant groups, there are also clear differences . . . in the cultures, in the circumstances in which they came to the United States, in the times they arrived, in the economic opportunities available, in the attitudes of dominant groups towards them, and in the structure and operation of governments..”²⁴ They find that, as a consequence, the “process of mobilization, incorporation, and responsiveness is problematic rather than automatic.”

The critical dimension in relationship to the European immigrant model’s usefulness in explaining the Latino experience in the U.S. is that of social class as it interacts with race and ethnicity, what Barnett refers to as “structural differentiation.”²⁵ In New York City, the relevance of this model to Latinos of lower class backgrounds, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, is highly doubtful, while for those with higher class backgrounds, such as Cubans and Colombians, it appears more appropriate.²⁶ However, as the impact of the large influx of lower class and darker skinned Cubans from the 1980 Mariel boatlift has shown, such models are extremely fragile guides within today’s American sociopolitical context: from being the model Latino group to be emulated in the 1960s and 1970s, after the boatlift a 1982 Roper survey found that Americans in general viewed Cubans as the least desirable group in the country, ranking them below blacks, Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans.²⁷

On both the questions of race and minority status in the U.S., blacks and Latinos exhibited differences. These differences are not all that clearcut but rather involve differences of degree. The reason for this is that among Latinos there are sectors that respond to these questions in much the same way blacks do, and among blacks there are foreign-born elements with views more similar to Latinos in this respect. Group perceptions of race and their minority status are clearly key in how the term “minority” is defined; making our lack of understanding of the form they have taken and can take a needed focus for greater attention.

How blacks and Latinos each view their status in the United States would, of course, have important implications for their respective stances on a wide range of social issues. Perhaps most illustrative of this is the issue of bilingual education, which is identified as primarily being a Latino concern. Blacks in general have not been receptive to the introduction of this approach for a variety of reasons. One that is most frequently aired is that bilingual programs in the schools would divert scarce funds away from much-needed compensatory programs for black children, a fear reinforced by teacher unions that perceive a threat to the jobs of their mostly non-bilingual members. In Boston in the mid-1970s and other places where there were legal battles over school desegregation and busing, and that had significant Latino populations, blacks also found themselves in conflict with demands for bilingual education that requires, by definition, a high degree of segregation of non-English speaking students.²⁸ The growing presence of non-English speakers, primarily Haitians, in the black population of New York, however, raises the bilingual issue within their own ranks, and is beginning to force American blacks to deal with this issue in a different way.²⁹ Despite this development in selected local areas, the fact remains that nationally and in New York generally, the black community's support of bilingual education is low and, at times, negative.

Another area of a significant divergence in views between blacks and Latinos is over the role of government in society. The black experience in the U.S., especially evident during the civil rights movement, is one that has come to see government, particularly at the national level, as socially activist. Many Latinos came to the U.S. with very different backgrounds thus creating less of a consensus on this question. These range from Latinos that are in the U.S. as non-citizens (legally and illegally) and those that left countries with politically repressive governments who would be suspicious or uncomfortable with government to those, like Puerto Ricans, who are U.S. citizens from birth and come from countries formally under the American political system.³⁰ The selectivity of some of the Latino migrations to the U.S. of people of higher social class backgrounds, such as was evident among pre-Mariel Cubans and many Central and South Americans, places economic concerns over political ones in their migratory calculus, which along with the influence of the views of many contemporary migrants in the U.S., reinforces an expectation of a very limited role of government in their lives. Among Latinos, therefore, a continuum of opinion on government is evident that, in large part, appears to be primarily generational and affected by social class background, indicating that it is a fluid area of opinion. While, once again, in the black community in New York a similar spectrum of views exists as its foreign-born sectors grow, it seems to be a stronger influence among Latinos given their more peripheral involvement in the U.S. civil rights movement.

A third issue area which is extremely controversial today is immigration policy. An important aspect of the debate over this issue is the degree to which newcomers, both legal and illegal, are taking jobs away from U.S. citizens.³¹ As the Liberty City riot in Miami in 1980 highlighted, blacks can come to see Latinos, in that case Cubans, as "foreigners" illegitimately taking jobs away from "natives."³² While this issue does not always emerge as starkly as this, it does loom as an unresolved tension in black-Latino relations throughout the country. Again, in New York City such a situation is being

increasingly replicated, although to a smaller degree, within the black community itself with its growing foreign-born elements.

Government Access

A critical area of concern for minority politics in New York City is the sharply divergent access to government that blacks have in contrast to Latinos. This section will briefly examine three areas in which this is the situation: representation among elected government officials, participation in the local government work forces, and the distribution of government expenditures on the poor.

Although blacks and Latinos currently make up over half of New York City's population, they were not represented in any elective government posts above the ward level (such as Mayor, City Council President, Borough President, etc.) up to 1985 when a black was once again elected Manhattan borough president since 1977, and were underrepresented in ward-level offices. In 1985, blacks and Latinos made up only 25 percent of the city's officeholders in the State Senate, 26 percent of those on the City Council, and 30 percent of those in the State Assembly.³³ The only citywide ward-based bodies where blacks and Latinos approached population parity are the thirty-two Community School Boards, which are themselves subordinate to a seven-member central Board of Education that is appointed by the Mayor and the Borough Presidents. Since 1975, the number of blacks and Latinos in these elected offices, excluding the School Boards, has remained fairly static, increasing from 35 to 38. On the School Boards, the number of blacks and Latinos has increased between 1973 and 1983 from 109 (37 percent of the total) to 129 (45 percent of the total).

However, when we compare the level of black with Latino political representation, large differences are revealed. Latinos, despite representing about 45 percent of the total black and Latino population in the city, held only 10 (or 26 percent) of the 38 elected government posts held by these two groups combined in 1985 that were mentioned above. On the Community School Boards, Latinos held only 48 (or 37 percent) of the 129 positions held by both blacks and Latinos after the 1983 election.

To an even larger degree, these differences in black and Latino levels of representation exist in city and state government employment. In 1983, blacks and Latinos combined comprised 40 percent of the total New York City government work force and 26 percent of its top executives.³⁴ When compared to the 32 percent of the total city government workers that were black, only 8 percent were Latino. Of the top city government executives, only 7 percent of the total were Latino in contrast to the 19 percent that were black. At the state government level, blacks and Latinos together account for 20 percent of the statewide government work force and 10 percent of the Governor's appointments to policy-level and other positions.³⁵ Even with smaller percentages in the state population (in 1980 Latinos accounted for 10 percent and blacks 13 percent of the state's population), Latinos held a miniscule 3 percent of state government jobs compared to 17 percent that were held by blacks. Of total gubernatorial appointments

as of 1984, Latinos made up less than 4 percent of the total, while blacks made up 6 percent.

A recent study on government expenditures on the poor found that although blacks and Latinos made up 71 percent of the city's poor people in 1980, they received only an estimated 65 percent of what it termed its "poverty budget," which it put at a total of \$14.8 billion in 1983.³⁶ Due to a variety of factors, a major one having to do with age and the effect of the more expensive services the elderly, who are mostly whites, receive, this analysis found that Latinos received less in grants and services than either black or whites. To the per capita poverty budget expenditure on whites in 1983 of \$6,786, blacks were allocated \$5,412 and Latinos \$4,517.

The significantly less access that Latinos have than blacks or whites to political and public bureaucracy representation, as well as to budgetary resources, would indicate that this would be a more salient issue to Latinos than to blacks who are in a better position to entertain "post-access" concerns. Politically, therefore, this Latino lag behind blacks has important implications and is the source for the greater emphasis Latinos seem to give to questions of basic group visibility, including symbolic recognition.

Electoral Participation Patterns and Levels

Many of the differences between blacks and Latinos that have been discussed here also impact on the electoral participation patterns and levels of these two groups and the type of issues this raises. An area where the importance of these differences in the electoral arena has become most pronounced in the last couple of years has been that of candidate preference, particularly in terms of the Jesse Jackson and Ronald Reagan campaigns for President in 1984, and the reelection campaign of New York Mayor Edward I. Koch in 1985. These, above all, have proven to be critical tests for the state of minority coalition politics in New York City.

The Jackson campaign, with its Rainbow Coalition strategy to unite all political "outsider" groups, was a clear opportunity to forge a black-Latino coalition. The results, however, were very mixed in New York. In the April 3, 1984 Democratic Presidential Primary in New York State, only 33 percent of Latinos voted for Jackson compared to 76 percent of Blacks.³⁷ While on the surface this difference between black and Latino voters would dispell any notion that they voted as a block, the fact is that this appeared to be by far the greatest degree of support that Jackson received from Latinos than anywhere else in the country.³⁸

In the 1984 Presidential election, compared to only 10 percent of black voters in New York City who cast their ballots for Reagan's reelection, over 30 percent of Latinos did so.³⁹ This occurred despite 80 percent of Latinos being registered in the Democratic Party, as are blacks. Therefore, even in terms of an election where it was widely perceived that black and Latino interests, particularly in New York City, were equally being threatened, the response of each group was significantly different.

A more recent example of this political divergence is the New York Mayoralty campaign of 1985. An important part of the opposition to the incumbent, Ed Koch, was thought by many to be the equally intense animosity shared by black and Latinos to what has been generally perceived as his insensitivity to minority concerns and his pandering to the white backlash element against black and Latinos.⁴⁰ It was felt by the anti-Koch forces that the momentum of the Jesse Jackson Rainbow Coalition strategy, which locally was antagonistic to Koch, would carry over into the Mayoral race.

The only problem with this strategy was that it glossed over large differences that existed between blacks and Latinos in their opposition to Koch's reelection. As early as 1984, polls showed that although 72 percent of blacks opposed his reelection, only 54 percent of Latinos did, with 46 percent supporting Koch compared to only 17 percent of blacks.⁴¹ A more recent poll, taken in April-May 1985, found that 66 percent of Latino Democrats planned to vote for Koch in the September 1985 primary compared to only 22 percent of blacks.⁴² The results of this primary was that an estimated 62 percent of Latinos voted for Koch compared to 42 percent of blacks and 71 percent of whites.⁴³

By assuming that as "minorities" blacks and Latinos automatically held the same political preferences, the anti-Koch forces assumed a unity that did not exist naturally and, as a result, developed a flawed political strategy that seems to have further divided blacks and Latinos, at least in terms of Koch's reelection. This situation became further aggravated when the black organization most prominent among the anti-Koch movement at the time, the Coalition for a Just New York, endorsed a marginal black candidate for Mayor at the last moment on February 8, 1985 at the expense of a much more viable Puerto Rican politician that they were expected to endorse.⁴⁴ This controversial decision, the outcome of political strategies and competition specific to black leadership politics in the city, illustrated the dangers of an overgeneralized and naive "minority" or "Rainbow" political strategy.

Such black-Latino voter divergences have not always characterized the political relationship between these two groups in the city. It was perhaps in 1966, in the vote over the retention of the Civilian Review Board in the Police Department, that the issue of race came to the fore politically in New York City with its greatest force.⁴⁵ In that election, which was seen as a critical election in this regard, blacks and Latinos voted to retain the Board by a large margin in contrast to whites who opposed it as overwhelmingly, with the outcome being its abolishment. From that point on blacks and Latinos were widely viewed throughout the city as forming a minority voting block as distinct from whites. This perception began to change in the 1970s and is clearly now a candidate for a major reassessment in light of the more recent developments discussed earlier.

Finally, even in terms of levels of voting there are important differences between blacks and Latinos. Latinos have consistently had lower registration and turnout rates than blacks in New York City: in the November 1984 Presidential election, 52 percent of voting age Latinos were registered to vote compared to 56 percent of blacks and 60 percent of whites.⁴⁶ (See table 3 below) However, despite equivalent turnout rates among those registered, 70 percent for blacks as well as Latinos, a lower percentage of

Latinos than blacks entering the voting booth cast a vote for President: 11 percent of Latino voters did not vote for any of the Presidential candidates (they cast what the Board of Elections terms a “blank vote”), compared to 7 percent of blacks and 5 percent of whites who did the same. A more extreme example of this problem was the 1983 New York State referendum on ten propositions. In that election, headed by a transportation bond issue question, over 44 percent of Latino voters in New York City entered the voting booth but did not cast any vote on the main proposition, compared to 30 percent of blacks and 13 percent of whites.⁴⁷

TABLE 3
Voter Participation Rates by Racial-Ethnic Group
for New York City 1982 and 1984 (in percentages)

	Latinos		Blacks		Whites		Total	
	1982	1984	1982	1984	1982	1984	1982	1984
Registration Rate ^a	35.1	51.8	39.4	56.1	48.7	60.2	44.7	57.8
Party Enrollment								
% Democrats	81.7	80.4	78.7	80.4	66.6	64.6	70.4	70.2
% Republicans	6.6	6.2	7.5	5.8	16.8	16.6	14.0	13.0
% Independents	9.4	11.1	10.9	11.4	12.9	15.5	12.2	14.1
% Other Parties	2.3	2.3	2.9	2.4	3.7	3.0	3.4	2.7
Gender of Those Registered								
% Men	40.2	41.0	54.4	41.0	43.9	44.3	45.6	43.3
% Female	59.8	59.0	45.6	59.0	56.1	55.7	54.4	56.7
Voter Turnout Rate ^b	63.3	69.6	64.2	70.0	71.8	81.7	69.8	77.6
Party Receiving Vote ^c								
Democrats	70.6	61.3	77.9	73.7	54.9	47.9	60.5	54.6
Republicans	14.1	22.2	10.8	13.6	31.7	40.8	26.1	33.3
Other Parties	7.0	5.9	5.2	5.9	9.7	6.5	8.8	6.3
Blank Votes	8.3	10.6	6.1	6.8	3.7	4.8	4.6	5.8

a. As percent of total voting age population for the group.

b. As percent of total registration for group.

c. Political party turnout breakdown for votes cast on particular party's line for top office on the ballot, not just for the candidate.

Sources: Calculated from data from the New York City Board of Elections, New York State Legislative Task Force on Reapportionment, and the U.S. Census Bureau.

In terms of party loyalty and voter participation trends, there are significant differences as well between blacks and Latinos. Although 80 percent of registered voters in both groups were, as already mentioned, enrolled in the Democratic Party, only 61 percent of Latinos compared to 74 percent of blacks voted on that party's line for President that year. Compared to the 1982 gubernatorial elections, the increase in registration rates was much higher among blacks and Latinos (each increased by 17 percentage points) than whites (who had an 11 percentage point increase). But the increase in voter turnout rates was lower for Latinos (a 4 percentage point increase) between 1982 and 1984 than for blacks (6 percentage points) and whites (10 percentage points), offsetting gains made in registration increases in this period by minorities. During the Jesse Jackson campaign, the differential impact of the increase in “group consciousness” on participation levels between blacks and Latinos became evident: in New York City, Jackson's campaign and appeal for a Rainbow Coalition served to dramatically motivate

blacks to have the highest turnout rate in recent memory in a primary held in the city, with 52 percent of registered black Democrats turning out to vote compared to only 38-39 percent of whites and Latinos on April 3, 1984.⁴⁸ Absent the Jackson candidacy in the general election that year, black turnout once again fell to previous low levels, but it apparently had little or no effect on Latino voters either way.

Reasons for Black-Latino Differences

Having outlined black-Latino differences in a number of important areas, it might now be appropriate to present some reasons for them. There are at least six underlying factors that require further analysis and research:

1. Historical Differences. As already mentioned, the effects of the black experience with slavery in the United States compared to the Latino colonial experience are critical to any understanding of many of the current values and perceptions of each group. The specific black history in the U.S. has produced a set of institutions, such as an indigenous black church and national civil rights organizations, that do not have equivalents in the Latino communities in the Northeast.⁴⁹ The deep moral dilemma that the “peculiar institution” of slavery has posed for the United States historically has elicited a significant level of white support both locally and nationally that does not have a counterpart, either in depth or length of time, in the Latino community, particularly in the Northeast.⁵⁰ This has important consequences for the type of resources and political support that blacks have available in contrast to Latinos.

2. Class and Occupational Patterns. While both the black and Latino communities in New York City are overwhelmingly poor and working class, there are important differences of degree in their respective class compositions and economic locations. For example, a recent study has found that in 1982 in New York City, out of 61 professional specialties analyzed, Latinos were represented on a par with their representation in the city’s labor force (18 percent) in only one, athletes, compared to 11 in which blacks had at least labor force parity (25 percent or above).⁵¹ There are other areas, already discussed, that are also indicative of these class/occupational differences, namely the greater representation of blacks in government jobs and the role that the black church has played in the development of an important black religious professional stratum. Latinos are also located in weaker sectors of the city’s economy, particularly manufacturing, to a greater extent than blacks.⁵² Such differences, subtle although they may appear, have important impacts on the resources and political interests of each group.

3. National versus Local Networks. In contrast to blacks, who have developed a fairly elaborate national network of institutions and influentials that include sectors of the country’s white power structure to some extent, Latinos are organized in a more local fashion. While Mexican-Americans in the Southwest come the closest among Latinos to blacks in this regard, although on a more regional basis, Latinos in the Northeast are projected much more locally. Therefore, Latinos in New York City do not have an equivalent to a National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),

National Urban League, or national network of black churches to help “frame” their local issues and agendas in a more national context in quite the same way that blacks do.⁵³

4. Residential Factors. In New York City, as has been observed elsewhere, Latinos appear to have different residential patterns than blacks, affecting how these communities organize themselves and even their degree of political representation. One feature of both black and Latino communities in New York that appears to be unique is the multiplicity of local neighborhood power structures that exist. Instead of there being one major area of the city that is predominantly black or Latino, there are many, each of which has its own history, political leadership, institutions, and specific issues and problems. Most recently in the black community, for example, there has emerged an internal power struggle for dominance between the politicians in Manhattan’s Central Harlem with those of Brooklyn’s Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhoods.⁵⁴ The dynamics of these neighborhood interactions and their overall political impacts are not well understood and have generally been downplayed or ignored in the literature.

One of the most noted differences to emerge from the few existing black-Latino comparative studies is that blacks are more residentially segregated than Latinos, and the political consequences of this in terms of electoral representation and reapportionment issues.⁵⁵ In New York City, for example, of the total 60 State Assembly Districts, only three have Latinos majorities up to 54 percent, while there are seven that have black majorities over 75 percent.⁵⁶ Some have argued that Latinos are, therefore, more integrated into the city’s population than blacks and point to this as an indicator of greater assimilation. However, the data and reality appear to indicate that rather than integration, what Latinos are experiencing in New York, particularly Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, is a more *detailed* residential segregation pattern than that of blacks due to a number of specific historical and political factors.⁵⁷ In other words, Latinos in New York City are highly segregated in smaller geographic areas than blacks, giving the *appearance* of greater residential integration as well as diluting their political strength in the city’s relatively large political divisions.

5. Cultural Factors. There are a number of cultural factors that affect how blacks and Latinos approach New York City politics. These flow primarily from their points of origin. The much larger foreign-born segment of the Latino population brings with it views toward race, nationalism, language, the role of government, and so on that have not been developed within a specifically U.S. context. These affect how each community defines issues, what symbols it responds to, styles of leadership, and their commitment to life and institutions in the U.S. The foreign-born factor, therefore, becomes a critical one to explore, not only in understanding black-Latino differences, but differences within each one of these two groupings.

6. Societal Responses. While most of this discussion has concentrated on the internal characteristics of these two minority communities, it is also important to examine the role of their social context in the development of these characteristics.⁵⁸ Above all, there are the economic functions that blacks and Latinos have adopted in New York City and how these have changed over time. The relationship between the economic role and status of a particular group and its political influence is striking, as is the case with

Puerto Ricans who are in a widely acknowledged weak political position at a time when their role in the New York economy is at its most dubious.

Government has also responded quite differently to blacks than it has to Latinos. For example, while it appears to have played a more direct role with blacks to counter unacceptable unemployment levels by providing them with low-level public sector jobs, its response in the Latino case has primarily been the provision of welfare.⁵⁹

CONCLUSIONS

At a certain level, it can be argued that such an emphasis on black-Latino differences belies the more important commonalities between these groups and that to compare two such poor communities in this way is a distortion of a more important reality. The problem with such an argument is that recent developments in New York City have revealed a greater potential for black-Latino political divisiveness at a point when they, together, have reached majority population status and should instead be poised to spearhead a new period in minority politics in the city. It, thus, becomes critical, from both theoretical and practical perspectives, to realistically assess those forces that underlie these tensions rather than to continue to ignore or downplay them.

What does such a black-Latino comparative analysis tell us? First of all, it highlights some of the conceptual strains in the term “minority.” This points to the need for a more restrictive use of the term. Convenient as it may appear, it is analytically weak and its overgeneralized use has had the effect of inaccurately homogenizing the experiences of racial-ethnic groups, or of being a shorthand device for subsuming the situation of Latinos and other groups under that of American blacks, no matter how inappropriate this may be.

There is a need, therefore, to get a better understanding of the “minority” category and how the groups it covers see themselves in relation to it.⁶⁰ By definition, it is a secondary identification for blacks and Latinos and in this sense points to the need for a much greater appreciation of the use of such terminology at different levels of abstraction. Historically, its meaning and salience as a form of group identification have changed and will continue to do so. The problem has been that the meaning of the term has been primarily determined by non-minorities rather than “minorities” themselves. In this conjuncture, the argument presented here is that this situation needs to be reversed.

More attention also needs to be given to the specificities of the racial-ethnic groups that fall under the minority category. Along with this is the growing need for comparative studies between these various groups.⁶¹ This would go some way to counter the tendency to only do comparisons between minorities and whites, which do not necessarily appear to be the most important, particularly in terms of minority community mobilization issues.

These considerations not only have an academic relevance, but a very practical one as well. For those interested in mobilizing minority political power, the issues raised in this

study can hopefully provide the basis for a more realistic assessment of the opportunities and problems involved in such coalition-building. Thus, although the level of abstraction chosen here has been to compare blacks with Latinos, it should also be clear at this point that difficult coalition-building issues exist *within* each of these communities themselves on a number of levels.⁶²

This analysis opened with the observation that New York City's shift to a "majority minority" city in the 1980s indicated that minority politics will be thrust into a potentially new level of activity and importance. This, however, is not assured and is contingent on a number of factors. One is whether blacks and Latinos will be able to forge the types of coalitions that are necessary or will continue the current process of fragmentation.⁶³ An important aspect of this will be the nature and future direction of black and Latino political leadership in the city, which has been in a state of crisis, not only locally but nationally, for some time now.⁶⁴

A second factor that is vital in defining the nature of minority politics in New York City is the response of dominant institutions and elites in the city and nationally. Will the continued growth of its minority population mean that white elites will seek to find ways to fairly incorporate nonwhites into the city's political system, continue to exclude them, or find more effective ways to co-opt them?⁶⁵ New York, more so than many other cities, has been able to postpone confronting the issue of minority political empowerment and has found ways to displace minority demands for even symbolic representation. The reasons for this resistance and the mechanisms used need to be better understood and analyzed.⁶⁶ However, the point is that minority politics is not something that is simply defined internally, but develops within a broader context that plays a critical role in shaping it as well.

A third factor affecting the impact of minority politics in New York City is how blacks and Latinos define the issues that they will be advocating. Since the late 1970s, when in the black community nationally electoral politics was embraced as the most viable strategy to pursue by most black leaders, the notion of a "New Black Politics" began to emerge.⁶⁷ What advocates of this approach pointed to was that black electoral politics carried with it a different set of values and issues than traditional interest or ethnic group politics did. Nelson describes this new thrust by pointing out that a "central premise of this approach to black political life is the notion that genuine progress can only be made if the pursuit of community goals is placed ahead of individual goals as an organizing priority. Proponents," he continues, "of the new black politics believe very strongly that the most potent form of power available to black America is power that emanates from the collective action of the community ... At bottom the new black politics is a politics of social and economic transformation based on the mobilization of community power."⁶⁸

In New York City, the prevailing policies of promoting economic growth and restructuring its economy at the expense of its poor people, who are overwhelmingly black and Latino, offer a critical test for the emergence of a "New Minority Politics" that is able to produce viable alternatives and a different political consensus in the City.⁶⁹ To only have black and Latino faces replace whites in the political system without major changes in policy, as appears to be currently occurring, would simply be a continuation

of politics as usual to the detriment of black and Latino interests in New York City. In this regard, and in light of the many challenges outlined in this study, minorities in New York City find themselves at a major crossroads today.

NOTES

1. Recent examples of this problem can be found in the following: Robert W. Bailey, *The Crisis Regime: The MAC, the EFCB and the Political Impact of the New York Financial Crisis* (Albany, NY.: State University of New York Press, 1984); Michael N. Danielson and Jameson W. Doig, *New York: The Politics of Regional Development* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982); Peter W Colby, ed., *New York State Today: Politics, Government, Public Policy* (Albany, NY.: State University of New York Press, 1985); Paul E. Peterson, ed., *The New Urban Reality* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1985), especially the editor's generalizations about Latinos which clearly contradict the New York case (p. 22); and, except for Tobier's contribution, Charles Brecher and Raymond D. Horton, eds., *Setting Municipal Priorities: American Cities and the New York Experience* (New York: New York University Press, 1984).
2. International data taken from: *World Development Report, 1980* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1980), pp. 110-111.
3. Emanuel Tobier, *The Changing Face of Poverty: Trends in New York City's Population in Poverty: 1960-1990* (New York: Community Service Society, 1984), pp. 103-105.
4. Ibid. Also see: Emanuel Tobier, "Population" in Brecher and Horton, eds., *Setting Municipal Priorities*, pp. 38-42; and Peter D. Salins, "New York in the Year 2000 Revisited," *New York Affairs* 7:4 (1983).
5. Leslie W. Dunbar, ed., *Minority Report: What Has Happened to Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians and Other Minorities in the Eighties* (New York: Pantheon, 1984).
6. Tobier, *The Changing Face of Poverty*.
7. See the following articles by Douglas S. Massey: "Residential Segregation of Spanish Americans in United States Urbanized Areas," *Demography* 16:4 (November 1979): 553-563; and "A Research Note on Residential Succession: The Hispanic Case," *Social Forces* 61:3 (March 1983): 825-833.
8. See various articles in Sidney W. Mintz, ed., *Slavery, Colonialism, and Racism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974).
9. Compare the following two reports: *Status of Black New York Report 1984* (New York: New York Urban League, 1984); and *The First Step Toward Equality: Hispanic Population Statistics, New York State/New York City* (New York: National Puerto Rican Forum, 1979). For an excellent case study, see: Richard Schaffer and Neil Smith, "The

Gentrification of Harlem,” paper presented to the Annual Conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, New York, May 24-29, 1984.

10. For examples of this see: Robert Rheingold, “Government ‘Minority’ Category Growing to Include More Groups,” *The New York Times* (July 20, 1978), p. 1; and Thomas A. Johnson, “Term ‘Minority’ Shunned by Black Social Workers,” *The New York Times* (April 22, 1979), p. 26.

11. Salins, “New York in the Year 2000 Revisited,” p. 18.

12. David Musick, *Oppression: A Socio-History of Black-White Relations in America* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1984).

13. Clara Rodríguez, “Puerto Ricans: Between Black and White,” *New York Affairs* 1:4 (Summer 1974).

14. “The colored immigrant understood quickly,” Ottley and Weatherby observed in 1940 about Puerto Ricans in New York City, “that most white Americans regarded anyone who spoke a foreign tongue, particularly Spanish, as being white, and therefore the immigrant called himself ‘white’.” Roi Ottley and William J. Weatherby, eds., *The Negro in New York: An Informal Social History, 1626-1941* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 191.

15. Roy Simon Bryce-Laporte, “New York City and the New Caribbean Immigration: A Contextual Statement,” *International Migration Review* 13:2 (Summer 1979): 214-234.

16. Frank Bonilla, “Ethnic Orbits: The Circulation of Capitals and Peoples,” *Contemporary Marxism* 10 (1985): 148-167.

17. For a discussion of these “expressions of presence,” see José Hernandez, “A Research Strategy for New Immigrants” in Lionel Maldonado and Joan Moore, eds., *New Immigrants and Old Minorities: The Urban Scene* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Urban Affairs Annual Review 28, forthcoming).

18. The Census Bureau found naturalization rates for 1980 of 25.5 percent for Dominicans, 24.9 percent for Colombians and 24.7 percent for Ecuadorians compared to a 50.5 percent rate for total immigrants nationally. See United States Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Profile of the Foreign-Born Population: 1980 Census of Population* (October 1984), Table 1. These Latino groups are the largest in New York City. For discussions on the political and social implications of these low naturalization rates, see National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO), *Proceedings of the First National Conference on Citizenship in the Hispanic Community* (Washington, DC: NALEO Educational Fund, 1984).

19. Discussed in: James Jennings, *Puerto Rican Politics in New York City* (Washington DC: University Press of America, 1977), pp. 59-63. More generally, see Joan M.

Nelson, *Temporary Versus permanent Cityward Migration: Causes and Consequences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Center for International Studies, 1976).

20. Adalberto Lopez, "The Puerto Rican Diaspora: A Survey" in his *The Puerto Ricans: Their History Culture, and Society* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1980), pp. 323-343. For an alternative view, see J. M. Blaut, "Are Puerto Ricans a National Minority?" *Monthly Review* 29:1 (May 1977): 35-55; and Edna Acosta-Belen. "The Literature of the Puerto Rican National Minority in the United States," *The Bilingual Review* Vol.: 1-2 (January-August 1978): 107-116.

21. Eugenia Georges, "New Immigrants and the Political Process: Dominicans in New York" (Occasional Paper 45: Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, New York University, April 1984); and Philip M. Kayal, "The Dominicans in NY," *Migration Today*, 2 Parts (June 1978): 16-23 and (October 1978): 10-15.

22. In the black case see: Marguerite Ross Barnett, "The Congressional Black Caucus: Illusions and Realities of Power" in Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr. and Paul Puryear, eds., *The New Black Politics: The Search for Political Power* (New York: Longman, 1982), pp. 48-53 for a recent, but brief, critique of the immigrant analogy; Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 53-81; Stanley Lieberson, *A Piece of the Pie: Blacks and White Immigrants Since 1880* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1980); and Steven P Erie, "The Two Faces of Irish Power: Lessons for Blacks," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, August 31-September 3, 1978.

23. Barnett, "The Congressional Black Caucus," p. 48.

24. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, *Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), p. 244.

25. Barnett, "The Congressional Black Caucus."

26. Jennings, *Puerto Rican Politics*, pp. 44-53, in contrast to Joseph P Fitzpatrick and Lourdes Travieso Parker, "Hispanic-Americans in the Eastern United States," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 451 (March 1981): 98-110; and Nathan Glazer and Daniel P Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), pp. lxx-lxx.

27. "Opinion Roundup," *Public Opinion* (June/July 1982), p. 34.

28. For a general discussion of this problem, see Manuel del Valle, Ruben Franco, and Camille Rodriguez Garcia, "Law and Bilingual Education: An Examination of the Litigation Strategy" in Raymond V. Padilla, ed., *Ethnoperspectives in Bilingual Education Research: Bilingual Education and Public Policy in the United States* (Ypsilanti, Mich.: Eastern Michigan University, 1979), pp. 73-76.

29. Susan Huelsebusch Buchanon, "Language and Ethnicity: Haitians in New York City," *International Migration Review* 13:2 (Summer 1979): 298-313.
30. See special issue on "The New Immigration" of *Society* (September/ October 1977); Glazer and Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, pp. 108-110; Joan Moore and Harry Pachon, *Hispanics in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), esp. chaps. 8-10; and, on a more general level, Colin Greer, "The Ethnic Question" in Sohnya Sayres et al., eds., *The 60s Without Apology* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 119-136.
31. Discussed in: Colin Greer and Josh DeWind, "A Labor-Oriented Perspective on Immigration Policy" in Alan Gartner, Colin Greer, and Frank Reissman, eds., *Beyond Reagan: Alternatives for the '80s* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), pp. 193-208; and George Borjas and Marta Tienda, eds., *Hispanics in the U.S. Economy* (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1985).
32. "Blacks: Resentment Tinged with Envy," *Time* (July 8, 1985), pp. 56-57.
33. George Hallett, "Tables: Percentage of Elected Officials in New York City That Are Black or Hispanic (1985)" (New York: Citizens Union Foundation, 1985).
34. "New York City Full-Time Work Force Statistics as Reported in the EEO-4 Report on Fiscal Year-End Payroll for June 1983" and "Summary of Top 135 Executive Positions in Mayoral Agencies," both cited in: Segundo Mercado Llorens, "Interview: Koch on Hispanic Issues," *U.S. Hispanic Affairs* (August/September 1984): 39.
35. William G. Blair, "Study Says Hispanic Workers Don't Get Enough State Jobs," *The New York Times* (October 31, 1982); Wayne Barrett, "Cuomo Rigs Race Record," *The Village Voice* (March 27, 1984); and Josh Barbanell, "Figure on State's Hispanic Hirings Disputed," *The New York Times* (May 6, 1984).
36. David A. Grossman and Geraldine Smolka, *New York City's Poverty Budget: An Analysis of the Public and Private Expenditures Intended to Benefit the City's Low Income Population in Fiscal 1983* (New York: Community Service Society, 1984), p. 48.
37. *The Puerto Rican and Latino Vote in the 1984 NYS Democratic Presidential Primary* (New York: Institute for Puerto Rican Policy, 1984), p. 2.
38. Ibid.
39. Calculated from data from the New York City Board of Elections, New York State Legislative Task Force on Reapportionment, and the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
40. Arthur Browne, Dan Collins, and Michael Goodwin, *I, Koch: A Decidedly Unauthorized Biography of the Mayor of New York City, Edward I. Koch* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1985), esp. chap. 13.

41. *The 1985 Mayoral Race and the Puerto Rican-Latino Community in New York City: A Challenge to Current Discussions* (New York: Institute for Puerto Rican Policy, 1984).
42. New York Times/WCBS-TV, "New York City Race Relations Survey" (April 27-May 3, 1985), Ques. 2.
43. These are preliminary estimates calculated from 99 percent counts of returns reported in newspapers.
44. Utrice C. Leid, "Mayoral Race '85: The Big Surprise," *The City Sun* (February 13-19, 1985), p. 1ff; and Jeffrey Schmalz, "Endorsement of Farrell Splits Minority Caucus," *The New York Times* (February 18, 1985), p. 81.
45. Edward T. Rogowski, Louis H. Gold, and David W. Abbott, "Police: The Civilian Review Board Controversy" in Jewell Bellush and Stephen M. David, eds., *Race and Politics in New York City: Five Studies in Policy-Making* (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 59-97.
46. See note 32. Asians, it appears, have an even lower voter registration rate than Latinos: in Manhattan's Chinatown, for example, the estimated registration rate was only 16 percent among its voting age population. In this estimate and those of other groups, no attempt has been made to factor in the ineligibility factor of noncitizenship, since the Census undercount combined with the uncertainty of estimates on the number of undocumented persons are difficult, if not impossible, to reasonably control for.
47. See note 32.
48. *The Puerto Rican and Latino Vote in the 1984 Democratic Presidential Primary*.
49. Lynn Walker, *Civil Rights, Social Justice, and Black America* (Working Paper 433: The Ford Foundation, New York, N.Y., 1984).
50. Robert L. Allen, with Pamela P Allen, *Reluctant Reformers: Racism and Social Reform Movements in the United States* (Garden City, NY.: Anchor, 1975).
51. Walter W. Stafford, *Closed Labor Markets: Underrepresentation of Blacks, Hispanics and Women in New York City's Core Industries and Jobs* (New York: Community Service Society, 1985), Table 1E.
52. Ibid. Also see Borjas and Tienda, eds., *Hispanics in the U.S. Economy*, esp. chaps. 10 and II.
53. There have been some efforts in recent years to address this problem in the Puerto Rican community with the establishment of organizations such as the National Puerto Rican Coalition, the National Conference of Puerto Rican Women, the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, and the National Puerto Rican/Hispanic Voter Participation Project.

54. John F. Davis, "Anti-Koch Strategy: Divide and Lose," *The Village Voice* (February 19, 1985), pp. 8ff.
55. See, for example: E. J. Dionne, Jr., "Integration Lies at Heart of Dispute on Primary," *The New York Times* (September 14, 1981). Also see Terry J. Rosenberg and Robert W. Lake, "Toward a Revised Model of Residential Segregation and Succession: Puerto Ricans in New York City, 1960-70," *American Journal of Sociology* 81 (March 1976): 1142-1150; and Delbert Taebel, "Minority Representation on City Councils: The Impact of Structure on Blacks and Hispanics," *Social Science Quarterly* 59:1 (June 1978): 142-152.
56. Figures from New York State Legislative Task Force on Reapportionment.
57. See: Angelo Falcón, "Puerto Rican Political Participation: New York City and Puerto Rico" in Jorge Heine, ed., *Time for Decision: The United States and Puerto Rico* (Lanham, MD.: North-South Publishing, 1983), p. 31; Rosa Estades, *Patterns of Political Participation of Puerto Ricans in New York City* (Hato Rey: University of Puerto Rico Press, 1978), p. 82; and José Ramón Sánchez, "Some Reflections on the Housing of Puerto Rican Labor in New York City From 1950 to 1980" (Unpublished paper: SUNY College at Old Westbury, 1983).
58. A point made by John Walton and Luis M. Salces, "Structural Origins of Urban Social Movements: The Case of Latinos in Chicago," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 3:2 (June 1979): 235-249.
59. Clara E. Rodriguez, "Economic Factors Affecting Puerto Ricans in New York" in History Task Force, Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, *Labor Migration Under Capitalism: The Puerto Rican Experience* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), pp. 211-212.
60. For example, see Felix M. Padilla, *Latino Ethnic Consciousness: The Case of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985).
61. A model of this approach is the recent study of California urban politics by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, *Protest is Not Enough*. This point is also made by John Hope Franklin and Joan W Moore in articles in an issue on "American Indians, Blacks, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans" of *Daedalus* 110:2 (Summer 1981): 1-12 and 275-299, respectively.
62. Douglas T. Gursk and Lloyd H. Rogler, "The Hispanics," *New York University Education Quarterly* 11:4 (Summer 1980): 20-24.
63. Angelo Falcón, "Puerto Rican and Black Electoral Politics in NYC in the 'Decade of the Hispanic'," *Newsletter: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños Hunter College* (June 1985), pp. 8ff.

64. Sam Roberts, "Residents Are Hard Pressed to Name Leaders: City's Minority Politicians Face a Recognition Problem," *The New York Times* (May 19, 1985), p. 6E.

65. Martin Shefter, *Political Crisis/Fiscal Crisis: The Collapse and Revival of New York City* (New York: Basic Books, 1985) provides an excellent historical analysis of these relationships. For a recent journalistic look at the city's power structure, see Sam Roberts, "Who Runs New York Now?" *The New York Times Magazine*, part 2 (April 28, 1985), p. 89.

66. Useful starting points are provided in Ira Katznelson, *City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States* (New York: Pantheon, 1981); and Jack Newfield and Paul DuBrul, *The Abuse of Power: The Permanent Government and the Fall of New York* (New York: Viking, 1977).

67. See, for example, the following: Preston, Henderson, Jr. and Puryear, eds., *The New Black Politics*; Charles V. Hamilton, "Political Access, Minority Participation, and the New Normalcy" in Dunbar, ed., *Minority Report*, pp. 325; Rod Bush, ed., *The New Black Vote: Politics and Power in Four American Cities* (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1984); and James Jennings and Monte Rivera, eds., *Puerto Rican Politics in Urban America* (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1984).

68. William E. Nelson, "Cleveland: The Rise and Fall of the New Black Politics" in Preston, Henderson and Puryear, eds., *The New Black Politics*, pp. 187-188.

69. Outlines of such alternatives are provided in William K. Tabb, *The Long Default: New York City and the Urban Fiscal Crisis* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982); and John Mollenkopf, *The Contested City* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983).

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